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Davidsonian Naturalism and “A-
Ontological” Philosophy of Mind
John Fennell
1 In this paper I will argue that Davidson’s position in the philosophy of mind undergoes a
change from the early “Mental Events,” where he emphasizes how it entails a physicalist
ontological position, to his later writings, which ultimately suggest an “a-ontological,”
discursive-pluralist  position.  In  this  later  position,  instead  of  foregrounding  the
physicalist  ontological  consequences  of  anomalous  monism,  Davidson  devalues  the
importance of the ontological significance of mental vocabulary and emphasizes instead
the importance of the humanistic explanatory interests that are served and preserved by
such vocabulary. I will also point out some collateral benefits of the later, a-ontological
position  –  namely,  that  it  defuses  two  common and  supposedly  telling  criticisms  of
Davidson’s anomalous monism, viz. that it is not really a form of (physical) monism, and
that  it  is  not  importantly  anomalous.  However,  before  doing  so,  I  spend some time
explaining  how  this  a-ontological  position  is  achieved,  which  is  through  Davidson’s
particular form of naturalism. In order to characterize his naturalism, I distinguish two
different senses of the term – anti-supernaturalism and non-normativism – and argue
that Davidson is committed to the first  but not the second.  Doing so enables him to
occupy a naturalistic position which holds that there is an irreducible normative-rational
dimension  to  human  beings  and  their  meaning-bearing,  understanding-embodying
activities (e.g., speaking a language and having intentional mental states) without having
to posit the existence of anything beyond the natural in order to account for it. While
evident throughout his philosophy, I will concentrate on how this naturalism shows itself
in  his  philosophy  of  mind,  where  it  is  signaled  by  the  conceptual,  as  opposed  to
ontological, character of his distinction between the mental and the physical. To hold
that the mental and the physical, or that reason and cause (and in the context of his
philosophy of mind I will use these terminological pairs interchangeably as normative-
rational  relations  are  constitutive  of  the mental  and  causal  or  law-like  ones  are
constitutive of  the physical  for Davidson1),  are conceptually as opposed to ontologically
distinct is to hold that the mental/physical, or reason/cause (or law-like), distinction is a
distinction not at the level of things or events themselves, but at the level of descriptions of
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things or events. That is, it involves holding that one can describe intentional phenomena
in a way that situates them in the “space of reasons,” i.e., as bearing rational relations to
each other, without thereby requiring that these descriptions refer to reasons as separate
ontological kinds, i.e.,  without rational descriptions hypostatizing reason into a kind of
thing.  In his  philosophy of  mind,  this  conceptual  distinctness  of  the mental  and the
physical is expressed in his thesis of the anomalousness of the mental, and in his later
writings I will show how this anomalousness of the mental gets expressed, in turn, as the
“a-ontological-ness” of the mental. In the final section I discuss what the point of mental
vocabulary is for later Davidson, given that it is not ontological, and argue that its value
has a distinctly Kantian flavor.
 
Two Kinds of Naturalism: Anti-Supernaturalism and
Non-Normativism
2 In order to get clear on just what kind of naturalism Davidson is committed to,  it  is
important to distinguish two senses of naturalism. The first form of naturalism consists in
the rejection of Meanings and Minds (with a capital “M”) – i.e., meanings thought of as
transcendent  abstrata (à  la  Frege)  and  minds  thought  of  as  Cartesian  immaterial
substances  categorically  distinct  from  anything  in  physical  nature.  As  Minds  and
Meanings understood in these ways are denizens of an extra- or super-natural domain of
either Platonic or Cartesian character, naturalism in this form is naturalism qua anti-
super-naturalism.  The  second  form  of  naturalism  amounts  to  the  denial  of  any
normative-rational dimension to human beings,  and thus denies a normative-rational
dimension  to  the  central  human  activities  of  holding  contentful  mental  states  and
speaking meaningful language. Naturalism in this second sense consists in reducing or
eliminating2 the is/ought, fact/norm, cause (or law-like)/reason distinctions, and so this
form of naturalism is naturalism qua non-normativism.
3 Unlike Quine who advocates both forms of naturalism, Davidson holds the first but not
the  second3 –  for  him,  mind,  meaning  and  reason  are  to  be  naturalized  (de-
supernaturalized,  de-transcendentalized)  without  being  naturalistically  reduced  or
eliminated. He does so by separating two issues that are typically run together: the issue
of  conceptual  reduction (whether mental/intentional descriptions or concepts can be
captured without loss in physical/causal (or law-like) descriptions and concepts) from the
issue of ontological reduction (whether non-physical things or states, e.g., platonic-like
abstractions or Cartesian mental substances, can be reduced to physical things or states).
Separating these two reductions allows for the possibility that the lack of a conceptual
reduction of mind and meaning does not entail that there is no ontological reduction,
that it need not carry in its train a dualist commitment to entities beyond the natural
world of spatiotemporal objects and events.4 This kind of naturalism is one in which mind
and meaning are de-transcendentalized, i.e., are nothing over and above physical objects,
events  and  the  relations  between  them,  without  thereby  being  stripped  of  their
normative-rational character.5
4 It  is  this  kind of  naturalism that  Davidson subscribes  to,  and since  it  insists  on the
irreducibility or distinctness of the mental and the physical, of reason and cause (or the
law-like), one needs to be clear on what this distinctness amounts to. By the expression
“the distinctness of  reason and cause (or the law-like)” one could mean that reasons
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cannot be causes (or law-like), or that causes (or what is law-like) cannot be reasons. This,
though, is not what Davidson means by the phrase, indeed far from it – not only is his
theory of action famously predicated on reasons being able to be causes and vice versa,6
his philosophy of mind identifies mental events with physical events at the ontological
level. So, since reasons can be causes and vice versa, and mental states are to be identified
with  physical  states,  the  distinctness  of  reason  and  cause  is  not  an  ontological
distinctness. Rather the distinctness is conceptual; it is not that there are two distinct
things  or  events  that  rational  and causal  (or  law-like)  descriptions  and explanations
respectively  refer  to,  it  is  that  one  and  the  same  things  or  events  (contents)  are
susceptible to rational and causal (or law-like),  mental and physical,  descriptions and
explanations. Though contents can be described in distinct ways, these descriptions can
nevertheless be true of the same things – one does not have to posit different things as
the bearers of the two descriptions, i.e., be committed to ontological dualism. The relation
between rational and causal (or law-like) descriptions, then, is rather like the relation
between  the  descriptions  “the  morning  star”  and  “the  evening  star”:  rational
descriptions are distinct from the causal (or law-like) ones but this does not necessarily
mean that these distinct descriptions are true of different things, just as the distinctness
of the descriptions of “the morning star” (viz. most visible celestial body in the sky in the
morning) and “the evening star” (viz. most visible celestial body in the sky in the evening)
does not require the existence of numerically distinct celestial bodies.
5 Thus,  the conceptual nature of the distinctness between the mental and the physical
dovetails with the form of naturalism I am attributing to Davidson here: that it does not
require an ontological dualism supports the form of naturalism which embraces anti-
supernaturalism,  but  that  it  insists  on  the  distinctness  of  mental  and  physical  (or
normative-rational  and  causal  or  law-like)  descriptions  means  that  it  rejects  non-
normativism. If normative-rational relations are conceptually distinct from causal or law-
like relations, and if they are constitutive of content-bearing states, then the normative-
rational dimension of these states (and meaning-bearing activities in general) can neither
be eliminated nor reduced to causal or law-like relations. As such, the normative-rational
dimension  is  not  banished  from the  picture  and  naturalism qua non-normativism is
resisted. However in being only conceptually distinct,  normative rational relations and
causal or law-like relations can well be ontologically compatible in the sense of referring to
the same kinds of things or events, and so need not require positing anything super-
natural to account for them. So naturalism qua anti-supernaturalism is embraced.
 
The Distinctness (or Anomalousness) of the Mental
6 In  his  philosophy  of  mind,  the  conceptual  as  opposed  to  ontological  nature  of  the
distinctness of the mental and the physical is signaled from the start, where the mental/
physical  distinction is  one that  qualifies  events-under-a-description rather  than events
themselves:
[A]n event is mental if and only if it has a mental description… physical events are
those picked out by descriptions that contain only physical vocabulary. (Davidson
1970: 211)
7 That  is,  what  makes  an event  a  mental  event  is  that  it  can be  described in  mental
vocabulary, and what makes an event physical is that it can be described in physical
vocabulary. And since all the mentally described events can bear physical descriptions as
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well, all events are physical (thus a weak kind of physicalism, token-identity physicalism,
is entailed). However, the conceptual as opposed to ontological distinctness of the mental
and the  physical  does  not  just  follow from this  initial,  and admittedly  problematic,7
suggestion about how to identify the mental and the physical; more importantly, it is
essentially  tied  to  a  core  commitment  of  Davidson’s  philosophy  of  mind:  the
anomalousness of the mental. Indeed, the conceptual distinctness of the mental and the
physical  is  just  another  way  of  expressing  the  thesis  of  the  anomalousness  (or  a
nomological-ness) of the mental, the thesis that there are no strict laws, no strict general
connections (whether in the form of type-identities or type-correlations) between mental
kinds and physical kinds.8 What is ultimately responsible for this anomalousness is that
the mental and the physical have different constitutive principles, more precisely, that
normative-rational principles play a constitutive role in the identification and attribution
of  contentful  mental  states  whereas  they  have  no  role  to  play  whatever  in  the
identification  and  attribution  of  physical  states.  Since  the  principles  constitutive  of
mental states are different in kind (in being normative-rational ones) from the principles
that are constitutive of physical states (in being descriptive-causal/law-like ones), the
former cannot be inferred from the latter, e.g., as a result of being type-identified or type-
correlated (nomologically connected) with them. For, if there were such strict mental-
physical laws, then the presence of a type of physical state would be enough to attribute a
(its  nomologically  correlated)  type  of  mental  state,  but  then  since  physical  states
constitutively bear out  causal  or  law-like relations,  which need not  reflect  normative
rational ones, the mental state attributed on their basis would no longer be guaranteed to
reflect  normative-rational  relations  that  it  bears  to  other  mental  states  already
attributed,  and  thus  normative-rational  relations  would  no  longer  be  constitutive of
mental state attribution.
8 To illustrate: suppose there were strict laws connecting certain kinds of neural states (NS1
and NS2) with beliefs of certain sorts – e.g., that if NS1 is present then one has the belief
that p and q, and that if NS2 is present then one has the belief that not-p. Now, if there
were such laws and the relevant  kinds of  neural  states  were instantiated,  one could
attribute the belief that p and q and the belief that not-p. That is, if there were such strict
psychophysical laws, one could attribute beliefs on the basis of the presence of certain
kinds  of  physical  states  irrespective  of  whether  attributing  such  beliefs  abided  by
normative-rational relations, such as the inference rule of simplification (or conjunction
elimination). In this way belief attribution would no longer be constitutively constrained
by  such  normative-rational  principles.  Of  course,  it  may so  happen  that  a  given
attribution of a mental state on the basis of its law-like correlated physical state reflects
the  normative-rational  relations  that  the  state  bears  to  other  mental  states  already
attributed (after all normative-rational relations may be mirrored in causal or law-like
relations),  but  this  would just  be a  happy happenstance;  the mental  state  attributed
would not have to be so correlated in order to be attributed in the first place. There would
be  no  necessity that  the  attributed  mental  state  did  bear  these  normative-rational
relations;  it  would be possible for it  not  to,  and so the constitutiveness of  normative-
rational  relations  to  the  mental  would  be  sacrificed.  Thus,  argues  Davidson,  the
distinctiveness of contentful states in constitutively bearing normative-rational relations
to each other blocks the possibility of strict psychophysical laws.
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Ontological Consequences of the Conceptual
Distinctness of the Mental and the Physical
9 What are the ontological implications of this conceptual distinctness of the mental and
the physical? I think two very different, though formally compatible, answers emerge at
different times in Davidson’s work: a certain kind of weak physicalism – token-identity
physicalism – which he emphasizes in his earlier work, and an “a-ontological” (or “post-
ontological” to use the felicitous phrase of Ramberg, 2000) attitude, i.e., an indifference to
ontological implications, that emerges in his later work. Both fall out of his separating
conceptual reduction from ontological reduction, but each expresses a different reaction
to, or attitude towards, this separation.
10 In his earlier work Davidson underlines that the conceptual as opposed to ontological
nature of the distinction between mental and physical at once makes conceptual room for
token-identity physicalism. It  is  a position that “shows how there could be identities
without correlating laws” (Davidson, 1970: 213); a position that shows how one could be a
physicalist,  an identity theorist  (each particular mental  event, i.e. ,  event described in
mental terms, is one and the same as some particular physical event or other, i.e., event
described in physical terms), without having to posit strict, generally applicable identities
or correlations between kinds of mental events and kinds of physical events. Rather, this
token-identity position can be characterized as follows: if one were to collect together all
the particular physical events it is not as if there would be a whole other class of events
over and above all these physical events that would have been left out, viz. the mental
events (for qua things, they are identical with the physical things, only described in a
different way). Thus, as Davidson sometimes puts it (Davidson, 1970: 214 and 1985: 243),
mental events are nothing over and above physical events, ontologically they are (token-)
identical  to physical  events,  but  this  is  not to  say that  the mental  is  nothing but the
physical.9 So, the irreducibility of the mental to the physical does not entail ontological
dualism.  (Davidson’s  emphasis  on  this  physicalist  ontological  implication  in  “Mental
Events” was perhaps due to the state of philosophy of mind at the time. By the early
1970s, type-identity theories were coming under attack from the multiple-realizability
objection, and one of the key questions that arose was whether these attacks on type-
reductionism undermined physicalist  accounts of the mind generally.  In this context,
Davidson’s view is prima facie exciting for physicalists since it opens up the possibility a
version of physicalism without type-reduction, and so suggests that arguments against
type-reduction need not undermine a physicalist account of the mind).
11 However a different attitude toward the ontological implications of his token-identity
view emerges from later writings:
Let me first  make clear that in my view the mental  is  not an ontological  but a
conceptual category… To say of an event, for example an intentional action, that it
is mental is simply to say that we can describe it in a certain vocabulary – and the
mark of that vocabulary is semantic intentionality. Reason-explanations differ from
physical  explanations  because  they  are  couched  (in  part)  in  an  intentional
vocabulary, and the basic concepts of this vocabulary cannot be reduced, or related
by strict laws, to the vocabularies of the physical sciences. (Davidson, 1987: 114)
Our mental  concepts  are as  essential  to  our understanding of  the world as  any
others  and  we  could  not  do  without them.  To  have  or  acquire  a  propositional
attitude,  such as  an intention,  desire,  belief,  hope,  fear,  is  to  have or  acquire a
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property in as objective a sense as can be… How could there be a question about the
ontology of mental entities for me if, as I hold, mental entities are identical with
entities we also describe and explain, in different terms, in the natural sciences?
(Davidson, 1999a: 595)
I agree with Rorty that “we are equally in touch with reality when we describe a
hunk  of  space-time  in  atomic,  molecular,  cellular,  physiological,  behavioral,
intentional, political, or religious terms.” Hunks of space-time are real enough, so
whatever we say about them, we are “in touch with reality,” even if we describe
some  hunks  as  witches,  griffons,  or  gods.  But  saying  this  does  not  eliminate
differences,  and I  persist  in  thinking  that  the  intensional  idioms of  psychology
differ from the rest. The differences do not, I  hope I have made clear, touch on
ontology…  What  I  have  chiefly  emphasized  is  the  irreducibility  of  our  mental
concepts. They are irreducible in two senses. First, they cannot be defined in the
vocabularies of the natural sciences, nor are there empirical laws linking them with
physical phenomena in such a way as to make them disposable. Second, they are
not an optional part of our conceptual resources.  They’re just as important and
indispensable  as  our  common-sense  means  of  talking  and  thinking  about
phenomena in non-psychological ways… It is worth emphasizing the irreducibility
of  the mental  but  only  because the irreducibility  springs  from something more
interesting  than  the  indeterminacy  of  translation  and  interpretation,  degree  of
complexity, clarity, holism. What makes the difference is the constitutive role of
normativity and rationality in psychological concepts, a role they do not play in the
natural sciences. (Davidson, 1999a: 599)
[S]o far as my argument for anomalous monism is concerned that argument is an
argument quite generally for monism, since it is designed to show that the ontology
of any science that is  not reducible to physics shares its  ontology with physics.
(Davidson, 1999b: 619)
12 These passages emphasize,  again,  the separation of the issue of ontological reduction
from the issue of  conceptual  reduction,  but  now a different inflection is  put on this
separation. This separation of ontological and conceptual issues, of course, ensures that
the conceptual irreducibility of the mental to the physical does not entail any dualist
ontological implications, but rather than highlighting that it makes possible physicalism
at  the  ontological  level,  now  he  highlights  that  it  downgrades  the  importance  of
ontological questions all together in the philosophy of mind (e.g. “The mental is not an
ontological  but  a  conceptual  category,”  “How  could  there  be  a  question  about  the
ontology of  mental  entities  for  me?,”  “The differences  [between the mental  and the
physical] do not touch on ontology,” “So far as my argument for anomalous monism is
concerned it is designed to show that the ontology of any science that is not reducible to
physics shares its ontology with physics”). Here, Davidson is not so much a physicalist
ontologically speaking, as a-ontological; he is not so much advocating a deflationist (i.e.,
anti-supernaturalist or physicalist) position in ontology, but a deflationist position about
ontology.  Rather than being reminded that the conceptual distinctness of the mental
allows for  a  physicalist  position in ontology,  we are told that  it  does  not  “touch on
ontology,”  and  it  does  not  because  mental  descriptions  carry  the  same  ontological
commitments as physical descriptions – they just commit one to the existence of physical
events.10 However the point now is that just because psychological vocabulary has no
dualist  ontological  import,  just because it  “shares its ontology with physics,” what is
distinctive and important about mental vocabulary is not something that can be got at by
looking to ontology. Or to put it another way, that mental vocabulary does not commit us
ontologically to anything in addition to what physical vocabulary does does not show that
it is retrograde and dispensable, rather what it shows, Davidson thinks, is that we should
look elsewhere than ontology to find where its significance and indispensability lies.
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13 Thus, in these later writings, the significance of Davidson’s form of naturalism is not that
it can show how one can still be a physicalist ontologically speaking while holding onto
the  distinctness  of  the  mental.  Rather,  it  is  that  in  showing  that  the  mental’s
irreducibility to the physical does not require the positing of a different ontology from
the physical,  it  in turn shows that  what is  significant about the irreducibility of  the
mental is not anything ontological. Precisely by separating conceptual from ontological
reduction and thereby showing how “the ontology of any science that is not reducible to
physics  shares  its  ontology  with  physics,”  ontological  issues  get  divested  of  their
importance  in  determining  whether,  and  what,  is  worth  preserving  about  mental
vocabulary. Instead of emphasizing the compatibility of his position with physicalism, as
he did before,  by reassuring us that the irreducibility of mental  vocabulary does not
entail ontological dualism, Davidson here emphasizes instead the relative insignificance
of  the  compatibility  of  an  irreducible  and  ineliminable  mental  vocabulary  with  a
physicalist ontology. (This change in emphasis is, also, likely due to the historical context
of philosophy of mind by the late-1990s. According to Davidson, the main danger that
now needs to be resisted is the Quine-inspired eliminativism of the Churchlands and their
followers,  who precisely  argued for  the  elimination of  mental,  or  folk  psychological,
vocabulary on the grounds of  its  lack of  ontological  import,  and consequently of  its
(supposed) falsity and explanatory bankruptcy.11 Although Davidson does not deny the
lack of ontological import of mental vocabulary, by nevertheless insisting that it still has
an indispensible explanatory role to play, he is, in effect, downgrading the importance of
such ontological matters).
14 From this “a-ontological” perspective, Davidson has new strategies of response to each of
the two main criticisms his anomalous monism has faced. Simply, critics see him caught
in  a  dilemma:  they  argue  that  Davidson  cannot  have  both  his  physicalism  and  his
anomalism – he can either hold onto the anomalousness of the mental or the physicalism,
but  not  both.  The  first  decry  the  weakness  of  Davidson’s  position  as  a  brand  of
physicalism charging that his version of physicalism, which embraces the anomalousness
of the mental, is really just crypto-dualism (epiphenomenalism, to be precise) in disguise.
This criticism is chiefly due to Kim (Kim, 1993: 20-21), who sees Davidson as ultimately
defending the anomalism and sacrificing the physicalism. The second charge that the
alleged anomalousness  of  the  mental  with  respect  to  the  physical  is  really  no more
profound or distinctive than, e.g., the anomalousness of the geological (or the chemical or
the biological, etc.) with respect to the physical, and that just as these do not undermine a
non-naïve nomological connection between the geological, chemical, biological, etc., and
the physical, neither should the supposed anomalousness of the mental with respect to
the physical. This criticism is chiefly due to Fodor (Fodor, 1987: 4-6 and 2000: 20f); and by
putting the mental in nomological relation to the physical, it saves the physicalism of
Davidson’s view but at the expense of the anomalism. I will look at these criticisms in
turn, and at Davidson’s new “a-ontological” strategies of response to each.
15 Kim, in effect, charges that Davidson’s token-identity physicalism is “token physicalism,”
a brand of physicalism so weak as to not deserve the title. In addition to stopping short of
countenancing general identities or even correlations, the weakness of Davidson’s token-
identity position as a physicalist position is evident in his initial characterization of what
makes an event mental  or physical  as simply being its  ability to bear a mental  or a
physical description,12 as we noted earlier. Given this, of course Kim is right to point out
that Davidson’s position is  a very weak form of  physicalism, and looked at  from the
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perspective  of  defending  a  physicalist  position  in  ontology  this  is  indeed  a  telling
weakness. Later Davidson concedes this point, but suggests that to look at anomalous
monism in this way (i.e., as primarily about defending a version of physicalism) is to miss
the point, for he now intends it to express not a physicalist position in ontology but an a-
ontological position. If using psychological vocabulary to describe a state does not entail
different ontological  commitments from using physical  vocabulary to describe it,  the
moral Davidson now wants to draw is: this just shows that the point and significance of
employing  mental  vocabulary  is  not  ontological.  In  the  past  (Davidson,  1970:  214)
Davidson  leaned  on  the  notion  of  supervenience  to  safeguard  the  claim  that  his
anomalous monism was a robust (or robust-enough) form of physicalism, arguing that
since the mental supervened on the physical, mental properties depended on, or were
determined by, physical properties, and since this showed the reliance of the mental on
the  physical,  he  claimed  it  underwrote  a  “robust-enough”  physicalism.  Now  he  has
changed tack: anomalous monism is not a form of dualism because of the conceptual
(rather  than  ontological)  nature  of  the  mental-physical  distinction,  and  while  he
concedes that the kind of physicalism this leaves him with is weak, he suggests that this
very weakness is just the point. It signals his overthrowing of the presumption that the
issue of fundamental importance in the philosophy of mind is the ontological  one of
establishing physicalism, and its replacement by the issue of determining the importance
and value of mental vocabulary, given that it carries no ontological import.
16 Perhaps as a result of the influence of Quine’s fervid physical realism, the philosophical
value of a discourse was thought to be measured by its ontological credentials, which
were in turn determined by its reducibility to physics: other discourses were thought to
be fact-stating (and thus bona fide) just to the extent that they were reducible to the
categories and laws of physics. An implication of this in the philosophy of mind was that
one should advocate a physicalist theory of mind: if one is to avoid peddling in make-
believe, then one’s theory of mind must be reducible (ultimately, ideally) to physics.13
This  of  course tied conceptual  reduction to ontological  reduction:  reducibility  to the
terms  of  physics  became  the  way  of  adjudicating  on  a  discourse’s  reality-disclosing
credentials,  its  capacity  to  be  talking about  anything real,  and thus  irreducibility  to
physics became the mark of discursive illegitimacy. It is this that later Davidson’s “a-
ontological” position contests: in separating conceptual and ontological reduction, and in
making all events trivially “hunks of space-time,” i.e., trivially events that can be talked
about  in  terms  of  the  categories  of  physics,  he  devalorizes  the  issue  of  ontological
reduction (by taking it for granted), with the aim of redirecting our attention away from
thinking it to be the one of prime importance in the philosophy of mind. In the final
section I will turn to the issue of what the importance of mental discourse consists in,
once it is divested of all ontological significance, but before doing so I will look at how
Davidson’s later position deflects the other traditional criticism of anomalous monism.
17 Unlike Kim who targets the (physical) monism of anomalous monism, Fodor targets the
anomalousness. He argues that the lack of strict laws relating the mental to the physical
makes the relation between the mental and the physical no different from the relation
between, e.g., the geological and the physical (and more generally, the relation between
the subject matter of any special science and the physical). Such special sciences do not
arrive at strict laws but rather non-strict, ceteris paribus ones, yet, according to Fodor,
these make for perfectly legitimate scientific laws and explanations, and the same is true
of psychology.  A psychophysical  law,  e.g.,  ceteris  paribus everyone who likes an acorn
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omelet will eat one (Davidson, 1974: 233) is of the same form as the geological law, ceteris
paribus a meandering river erodes its outside bank (Fodor, 1987: 5). Both are non-strict in
that they require all kinds of provisos to be satisfied, or escape clauses to be written in,
before they are even remotely capable of expressing a law-like relation. Just as the latter
contains conditions like: provided that weather conditions do not change and the river
does not freeze or dry up, or provided that a dam is not built to reduce the volume and
pressure of water on the banks, or provided that the banks are not reinforced by steel,
etc., etc.; so does the former whose ceteris paribus clause may include: provided that the
omelet desirer does not believe the omelet is contaminated, or that he does not want to
ruin his appetite, or that he has not gone vegan, and so on. Now, just as this does not
undermine  the  scientific  rigor  and  explanatory  value  of  the  geological  law,  neither,
claims Fodor, should it the psychophysical law. For Fodor, psychology is analogous to
geology and the other special sciences on this score: psychology arrives at psychological
and psychophysical laws which are ceteris paribus laws with no less a claim to scientific
rigor, predictive success and explanatory value with respect to intentional phenomena
than  the  ceteris  paribus laws  of  a  special  science,  like  geology,  have  with regard  to
geological phenomena.
18 Despite  the  fact  that  Fodor’s  strategy  may well  have  the  benefit  of  actually helping
Davidson  answer  the  previous  criticism  –  for  if  laws  governing  the  mental  are  no
different in kind from those governing geological phenomena, and given that geological
laws  are  not  thought  to  compromise  a  robust  physicalist  account  of  geological
phenomena  then  neither  should  psychological  laws  compromise  the  physicalism  of
mental phenomena either – the cost is that it would undermine the sui generis nature of
the anomalousness of the mental, to which Davidson is still very much committed.14 For
Davidson,  the  reason  why  the  anomalousness  of  the  mental  is  different  from  the
anomalousness of the geological (and indeed the anomalousness of the subject matter of
any  other  special  science)  is,  as  we  noted  earlier,  due  to  the  constitutive  role  that
normative rationality plays in intentional phenomena, as against the complete non-role it
has  in  the  constitution  of  geological,  chemical,  biological,  etc.,  phenomena.  This
distinctiveness of the mental’s anomalousness is expressed now not by his attempt at
distinguishing strict and non-strict laws, which in turn forced a further distinction to be
made between the  non-strict  laws of  the  special  sciences  and the non-strict  laws of
psychology (Davidson, 1970: 216-223 and 1993: 9-11) but by his distinguishing between the
nature of psychological explanation and the nature of explanation in the special sciences.
The anomalism of the mental is now something that shows itself in the distinctive nature
of psychological explanation.
19 Before  embarking  on  an  account  of  what  the  value  of  mental  vocabulary  and  the
distinctiveness  of  psychological  explanation consists  in  for  later  Davidson,  it  will  be
useful to sum up his position as it now stands in relation to his interlocutors. In order to
do so, I will compare their respective attitudes towards a famous passage from Word and
Object:
One may accept the Brentano thesis [of the irreducibility of intentional idioms to
physical ones] either as showing the indispensability of an autonomous science of
intention, or as showing the baselessness of intentional idioms and the emptiness of
a science of intention. My attitude, unlike Brentano’s, is the second. (Quine, 1960:
221)
20 What is interesting here is that Davidson, Brentano and Quine all agree that intentional
phenomena  in  general  cannot  be  reduced  to,  or  read  off,  or  inferred  from,  or
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nomologically  aligned  with,  physical  phenomena,  but  they  each  draw  different
conclusions from this. (Note that Fodor, unlike the other three, rejects the “Brentano
thesis.” He holds that mental phenomena can be nomologically aligned with physical
phenomena in just the same way that geological phenomena, or the phenomena of other
special  sciences,  can  be  nomologically  aligned  with  physical  phenomena).  Brentano
concludes: therefore, we need an autonomous science of the intentional, i.e., psychology
(or  for  him,  phenomenology).  Quine  concludes:  therefore,  so  much  the  worse  for
intentional notions – get rid of them from our account of what is real (i.e., eliminative
physicalism). But, Davidson’s conclusion is different from both. He concludes: therefore,
there is no science of psychology (contra Brentano), that psychology (the area of inquiry
that investigates the intentional) cannot be a science, like the other natural or physical
sciences. Psychology, though, for all that, is still a legitimate area of inquiry according to
Davidson; it is just not science-like (contra Quine): it will not arrive at strict (or “strict-
enough”) laws that predict and explain psychological phenomena by relating them to the
underlying physical data in the way other sciences do.15 Davidson’s position is that we
should stop thinking of psychology as a science, stop thinking that it provides strict, or
“strict-enough,” laws,  stop thinking that its ceteris  paribus laws are no different from
those of the special sciences (à la Fodor). But we should not think less of it because of this,
nor  think  that  because  of  this  we  should  eliminate  psychology  from the  bounds  of
legitimate discourse or “canonical notation” (à la Quine and the Churchlands), nor think
that a view that embraces psychology’s irreducibility to physics is crypto-dualism (à la
Kim).  Again,  for  Davidson,  such  a  view is  not  dualist  because  of  the  separation  of
conceptual and ontological questions, and its failure at being a science is not something
that needs to be apologized for. Instead of trying to show how it is science-like after all,
later Davidson advocates discursive pluralism; i.e., he tries to show that reducibility to
physics and modeling all explanation on so-called “hard” scientific explanation are not
the only games in town. There are other forms of legitimate explanation that need to be
recognized and saved from scientistic imperialism.
 
The Importance and Value of Mental Vocabulary
21 The issue that remains, of course, is: if the conceptual distinctness of mental vocabulary
does not show up ontologically, if psychology does not talk about anything not already
covered by neuroscience (and ultimately physics) why should it be preserved? What is the
value or purpose of psychological descriptions that is lost, according to Davidson, even if,
eliminating them (as Quine and the Churchlands advise) would not result in any loss in
our ability to talk about anything that really exists? A clue can be given by concentrating
on the value of the categories and concepts of a special science, e.g., geology, which is
likewise strictly irreducible to physics yet shares its ontology with physics. However I
want to emphasize at the outset that this analogy is double-edged, for while initially I will
point  to  a  similarity  between  psychology  and  geology,  later  I  will  point  to  a  more
important dissimilarity between them. First, though, the similarity: take the so-called law
of geology, “Other things being equal, a meandering river erodes its outside bank,” and
suppose we try to reduce it  to the categories that physics employs,  by giving purely
physical descriptions of all the myriad events and materials that constitute meandering
rivers and eroding outside banks. Even supposing one could give an exhaustive physical
description of all the possible ways in which rivers and banks could be instantiated across
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physical  differences  in  liquid  and  bank  composition,  temperature  and  pressure
conditions, etc., all of which would ultimately have to get analyzed into the favored terms
of physics (say, sub-atomic particles and the laws governing them), what such a highly
complex physical law would miss, apart from simplicity, is the way that the geological law
can classify these very different (from a purely physical standpoint) events into kinds that
are significantly alike in some way so as to all constitute events of meandering rivers and
eroding outside banks. The physical descriptions by themselves provide no account at all
of why these different occurrences should be grouped together as occurrences of the
relevantly similar kinds that the law relates to, and also of why doing so is useful or
valuable.  This  can only  be  achieved by  employing  the  geological  vocabulary  for  it
discloses a significant pattern in the phenomena not captured in the diverse physical
descriptions that pulls its weight explanatorily. It pulls its explanatory weight because its
way of classifying events into kinds illuminates a significant relationship between events
of one kind (windings of rivers) and events of another kind (wearings of banks). The value
of the geological law is that while it does not unearth some new order of reality at the
ultimate level of ontological composition, after all the geological phenomena it speaks of
are all  ultimately arrangements of  sub-atomic physical  stuff,  nevertheless it  discloses
patterns  in  this  fundamental  physical  stuff  that  are  opaque  to  the  basic  physical
descriptions  themselves,  but  yet  serve  useful  (to  us)  explanatory  purposes,  such  as
prediction and control of river bank erosion.
22 Similarly, psychological vocabulary serves to institute psychological kinds which enable
us to identify and track explanatorily significant patterns in these otherwise physically
describable phenomena but to which the physical descriptions are blind. Even if instances
of these psychological kinds are identical with instances of certain physical kinds, this
token identity to physical kinds will not explain what psychological kinds they belong to
and why, nor will it capture the value of classifying events into these psychological kinds.
As with the geological law, a psychological “law” such as “All things being equal, in the
main someone who believes  p does  not  also  believe  not-p”  is  a  law that  will  detect
similarities in kinds of mental states across a myriad of different contents realized in a
multitude of physical ways. Left with just the physical descriptions of these mental states,
one  would  have  no  way  of  understanding  what  it  is  about  these  variously  different
physical states that makes them belong to the same kinds (believings-that-p that are not
also believing-that-not-p) as well as what the value of classifying events into these kinds
is.
23 So far I  have used the analogy with geology to tease out a similarity between it and
psychology; now I want to point out the important contrast between the geological and
psychophysical “laws,” from Davidson’s perspective. The psychological “law’s” difference
from the geological law is that the patterns it discloses and traces are normative-rational
patterns that are constitutive of the mental kinds disclosed and that seeing mental kinds
as essentially normative-rational kinds pulls its weight explanatorily. It does so, though,
not so much because it shows us that one kind of event (a believing-that-p) is not followed
by another kind of event (a believing-that-not-p), although Davidson thinks it will do this
in the main,  but because it  illuminates a basic,  minimal condition on finding certain
events to be contentful events or intentional states (i.e., psychological kinds) in the first
place. Psychological descriptions classify events into significantly relevant kinds in virtue
of normative principles of rationality, such that events so classified bear out normative-
rational relations with certain other events, and that they do is a condition of seeing
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these events as content bearing events at all. (Geological descriptions, of course, do not –
there is no requirement that river-meandering events bear normative-rational relations to
bank-eroding  events).  The  explanatory  interest  served  by  classifying  some  physical
events into mental kinds according to normative-rational principles of classification is
not the scientistic interests of prediction and control, but the hermeneutic interest of
understanding.  This explanatory interest gets us to see that what is important about
some physical events – events that are also describable in mental terms – is not that they
abide by laws that enable us to predict and control them, but that in being meaning-
making or understanding-embodying events constituted by norms of rationality, they
express a way of understanding which demands a different mode of engagement if we are
to come to grips with them, a mode of engagement that tries to appreciate, respect or
understand the ways of understanding they embody, rather than one that tries merely to
predict them.
24 Thus, the distinctness of the mental and why it is worth insisting on is not just that it
allows us to discern kinds that are significant but which are opaque to purely physical
descriptions  (geological  descriptions  have  this  value  as  well  as  we  saw);  more
importantly, it enables us to see that the value of the kinds it discerns is different from
prediction  and  control,  but  involves  instead  understanding,  or  what  Davidson  calls
(hermeneutic) charity. That the mental descriptions classify stuff into kinds that can also
be described in physical terms, and thus that mental descriptions do not commit one to
an ontology any different from what a purely physical vocabulary commits one to, is
important only to the extent that it points to the fact that the distinctness of mental
vocabulary  lies  elsewhere  than  ontology.  What  is  important  about  insisting  on  the
distinctness of  mental  descriptions from physical  ones is  that doing so enables us to
recognize  the  different  interests  that  these  different  vocabularies  serve:  the  one
prediction and control, the other understanding and rational respect, and that the second
interest is of deep importance if we think it important to think of ourselves and others as
meaning-carrying, understanding-embodying, rationally autonomous agents who demand
understanding, hermeneutic charity, and rational recognition, rather than merely being
causally  determined or  law-governed objects in  need of  prediction,  manipulation and
control.
25 In this way, the point Davidson is ultimately making in insisting on discursive pluralism
and the irreducibility of intentional concepts is a Kantian one, and in this regard it is
instructive to remember that even the early “Mental Events” is framed at beginning and
end by passages quoted from Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Kant’s project
was to reconcile two competing images of human beings and their place in the world
which emerged with the rise of the “new science” – the scientific (or naturalistic) image
and the humanistic image.16 The scientific image depicts the world as a system governed
by natural  laws which describe the causal  processes that  exhaustively determine the
behavior of  all  objects in the world.  In this picture,  human beings are thought of  as
natural objects just like any others in the world and as such our behavior is thought to be
thoroughly determined by covering laws. The humanistic image, on the contrary, views
human thought and action as normatively constrained, even rationally governed, not just
causally determined. Of-course qua body, a human being is entirely a law-governed object
– if I fall from a bridge I will accelerate downwards at the same rate as any rock, 9.8 m/s2.
However human thoughts and actions are not to be entirely understood as the causally
determined movements of bodies. Unlike rocks and trees our actions are capable of being
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judged reasonable (or not) in light of the beliefs and desires we hold, and thus should not
be seen entirely as the effects of antecedent, external causes. Similarly, the activity of
thinking is not a purely causal or law-governed process: thoughts are not just causally
related to each other, they are also normatively constrained, specifically by norms of
reason expressed, inter alia, by logical laws or rules of inference. This humanistic image
springs from the insight that human thought and action are subject to normative-rational
governance and are thereby free, i.e., not purely causally determined. For Kant freedom
and rationality are intimately connected: rationality, whether manifested theoretically in
forming judgements and thoughts or practically in performing actions, requires freedom
from causal determination.17
26 For  Kant,  then,  normative  rationality  pervades  human  thought  and  action,  and
Davidson’s similar insistence on the constitutive role that reason plays in his account of
human  thought  and  action  is  the  central  commonality  he  has  with  Kant.  Kant
characterizes the freedom or normative rationality of human thought and action in terms
of the distinction between acting in accord with a rule and acting out of a conception of a
rule  (Kant,  1964:  397-399).  Acting  in  accord  with  a  rule  is  the  type  of  behavior
characteristic of natural objects and involves no recognition on the part of the object of
the rule governing its behavior. Rocks do not recognize the validity of the law of gravity
and on the basis of that recognition fall at the rate of 9.8 m/s2; rather, they cannot help
but act in accord with that natural law which is why it makes no sense to ask whether
they should fall at that rate.18 Hence the rules that natural objects merely act in accord
with are purely descriptive and predictive rules – they report how it is that objects have in
fact behaved in the past and thus how they can be expected to behave in the future.
However, thought and action done from a conception of a rule are not like this; they
involve the agent’s recognition of the validity of the rule and his thought and action
conform to it on the basis of that recognition. Hence for creatures who can think and act
out of a conception of a rule we can explain their action and belief under the aspect of its
embodying an understanding (of the rule), or expressing a meaning that is the result of a
self-conscious exercise of reason. To view humans as free in Kant’s sense is to adopt this
hermeneutic  stance  towards  us,  or  in  Davidsonian language,  it  is  to  have  a  charity-
according  engagement  with  us,  which  is  in  turn  to  see  our  thinking  and  acting  as
constitutively normative-rational activities, activities for which it is appropriate to ask
whether how we do in fact think and behave is how we should (given our understanding
or  rational  self-consciousness).  Furthermore,  like  Kant’s  distinction  between  causal
determination and freedom, Davidson thinks of the distinction between the physical and
the mental, or the natural and the normative, not as a distinction between two distinct
kinds of things or substances (or in the terminology I’ve been using, not as an “ontological”
distinction),  but as a distinction between two different ways of  describing or  explaining
thought and action (or what I’ve been calling a ‘conceptual’ distinction).19
27 Davidson writes at the end of “Mental Events,” “The anomalism of the mental is thus a
necessary condition for viewing action as autonomous” (Davidson 1970: 225). I take this to
mean the following: that in explaining the freedom (autonomy) of human beings and
their  actions  it  is  crucial  to  think  of  ourselves  and  others  as  subjects  capable  of
recognizing norms of rationality and of responding to these norms on the basis of such
recognition, rather than merely as objects that conform to laws (even if they are not
entirely strict ones) external to themselves. Davidson’s point is that as long as we think it
important  to  think of  ourselves  and others  as  free  in  this  Kantian sense,  we should
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continue  to  think  it  important  not  to  dispense  with  intentional  psychological
descriptions. In sum, Davidson is insisting that the distinctiveness, value and importance
of  mental  descriptions  consists  in  their  pointing  to,  and  safeguarding,  this  Kantian
conception of ourselves as free; that such mental descriptions should not be eliminated if
we are to do full justice to this conception. However, it is a conception of ourselves which
is in danger of being lost if we concentrate, as late-twentieth century philosophy of mind
does, on the scientistic issue of the ontological reduction of mind to body.
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NOTES
1. However  by  making  the  reason/cause  (or  law-like)  and  the  mental/physical  distinctions
interchangeable in this context, I am not also suggesting that the mental/physical (and thus the
reason/cause  or  law-like)  distinction  and  the  mind/body  distinction  are  likewise
intersubstitutable. As we shall see in the next section, that they should not be collapsed into each
other is essential for understanding the kind of naturalism that Davidson advocates: the former
distinction(s) is a conceptual distinction (a distinction in the way we describe or conceive things),
the latter an ontological distinction (a distinction in the nature of the things themselves),  and
distinguishing between these two distinctions allows one to hold that mental  talk is  distinct
from, or irreducible to,  physical talk without this thereby requiring,  or entailing,  ontological
dualism.
2. Reductive and eliminative naturalism are of course different: the former involves seeing the
putatively non-natural (i.e., the normative) as really natural and so as not non-natural after all,
while the latter involves seeing the normative as really non-natural but for this very reason
advocates its  elimination.  At the end of the day,  then,  for both forms of naturalism there is
nothing non-natural. It is this similarity in the conclusion they reach, rather than the different
routes they take to reach it, that is of importance to me in characterizing Davidson’s contrasting
form of naturalism.
3. Davidson’s difference from Quine in resisting the second form of naturalism is signaled by his
according the principle of charity a constitutive role in interpretation, rather than a pragmatic
role, as Quine does. To take the principle of charity as constitutive of the (attribution of) content
of  (to)  mental  states  and  sentences  is  to  hold  that  the  normative-rational  principles  that
comprise it must generally apply to beliefs and believers: i.e., that something could not (be taken
to) be a believer unless his/her beliefs accord with these principles for the most part.  Thus,
Davidson’s theory of belief and meaning attribution gives an essential role to normative-rational
considerations,  for to insist  that charity is  constitutive of interpretation is just to insist  that
normative principles of rationality act as constitutive constraints on the (attribution of) meaning
of (to)  mental  states and utterances.  Incidentally,  Davidson follows Quine in holding that  all
there is to the content of beliefs and the meaning of sentences is what can be got from our
practices  (i.e.,  radical  interpretation  or  translation)  of  finding  out  about,  giving, or  attributing
meaning  and  content.  This  entails  that  conclusions  reached  in  radical  translation/radical
interpretation about meaning and content immediately carry a metaphysical sense as well as an
epistemological one.  Thus,  the  constitutivity  of  charity  can  be  taken  to  express  both  an
epistemological thesis (i.e., of setting out constraints that govern what it is to attribute beliefs or
take someone to be a belief holder) and a metaphysical one (i.e., of setting out conditions that
determine what it is to be a belief or believer). That radical translation and interpretation issue in
conclusions that have simultaneously an epistemological and a metaphysical sense is what the
use of parentheses in earlier sentences of this note is intended to capture.
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4. In  Davidson’s  terminology:  the  irreducibility  or  ineliminability  of  the  normative-rational
character  of  the  mental  to  the  law-like  character  of  the physical  is  its  “anomalousness”;  its
avoidance of positing anything ontologically extra-physical or super-natural is its “monism.”
5. I have elsewhere (Fennell, 2010) called this naturalistic position “neo-Kantian” since it insists
on Kant’s distinction between “ought” and “is,” “norm” and “fact,” “reason” and “cause.” As
such it highlights, in Kantian fashion, the indispensible role that reason must play in an adequate
account  of  rational  creatures  like  us  and  our  rational  activities  of  speaking  a  language  and
entertaining content-bearing mental states, while denying that this irreducibility requires the
positing of a transcendent realm of Meanings or a domain of immaterial substances where such
normative-rationality is to be housed. I further develop Davidson’s connection to Kant in the
final section of the paper.
6. This account of the relation between reasons and causes, which while distinguishing reasons
from causes is careful not to entirely divorce them (and so precisely allows that reasons can be
causes), is the centerpiece of his philosophy of action (Davidson, 1963). That a reason can be a
cause of an action is what enables the distinction, crucial in that paper, between something’s
being a reason for an action and its being the reason why the action was performed, which in
turn is crucial to Davidson’s account of the identity of an action. For example, I could perform
the action of turning on the living-room light because I desire to find my car keys and believe
turning on the light is  a good way of satisfying this desire,  or I  could perform the action of
turning the light on because I believe that there is a prowler in the yard and desire him to leave
and believe that turning on the light will scare him away. Each belief-desire complex forms a
reason for turning on the light but which one is the reason for the action is determined by which
one was the actual cause of the action, as a matter of fact. In this way that a reason can be a cause
of  an  action  is  crucial  to  an  intentional  action’s  being  the  intentional  action  that  it  is:  i.e.,
whether it is a trying-to-find-my-car-keys action or a trying-to-scare-off-a-prowler action.
7. It is problematic because while it guarantees that every event is physical (since every event
can truly bear the physical description, e.g., “either was two stars colliding or was not two stars
colliding”), it equally ensures that every event is mental (since every event can truly bear the
mental description, e.g., “either was noticed by Jones or was not noticed by Jones”). This makes
for obviously trivial senses of “mental” and “physical” since they can apply to every event, and it
gives rise to a very trivial brand of physicalism: since all events are physical, all mental events
are physical (thus it’s a version of physicalism), but likewise, since all events are also mental, all
(physical) events are mental. Thus the kind of physicalism it produces is just as much a kind of
idealism.
8. Strictly,  the anomalism of  the mental  involves the denial  of  psychological  laws as well  as
psychophysical  laws.  However,  since  I  am interested in  what  anomalism implies  for  mental-
physical relations, I will concentrate on its denial of psychophysical laws.
9. However, this token-identity does not entail that there are any general (type-) identities, or
strict type-correlations, between events insofar as they are described in mental terms and those
same events  as  they  are  described  in  physical  terms  –  for  the  mental  and  the  physical  are
conceptually distinct or anomalous for the reason given in the last section.
10. Note that this indifference towards ontological questions precisely results from psychological
talk sharing its ontological commitments with physics, and thus is compatible with physicalism.
It is in this sense that, as I remarked earlier, Davidson’s later attitude of ontological indifference
is  formally compatible  with  his  earlier  physicalist  position  despite  being  very  different  in
philosophical spirit.
11. Their view is that since mental terms do not refer to mental entities that really exists, such
vocabulary belongs to a retrograde explanatory theory (folk psychology) that trucks in “make-
believe.” As such, they argue it should be eliminated in favor of physical vocabulary, which does
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have real reference, and which does belong to a rigorous, scientific theory (e.g., neuroscience)
that explains the phenomena in question more clearly and precisely.
12. This characterization is still present in the later writing, for in the “hunks of space-time”
passage  cited  earlier,  he  says  that  what  makes  an  event  or  object  physical  or  biological  or
chemical  or  mental  or political  or  religious or mythical,  etc,  is  simply our using physical  or
chemical or biological (etc.) descriptions to talk about it. But in keeping with our a-ontological
interpretation, it is evident from the passage that he thinks that engaging in such talk does not
commit  us  ontologically to  anything  more  than  we  are  committed  to  by  using  the  physical
descriptions, so if we think that physics gives us the true account of what there is, in using these
other descriptions we will not be talking about stuff that is not real. We will not be talking about
stuff that is not physical (space-time hunks); rather we will be talking about that same physical
stuff  but in different language or under different descriptions.  Thus,  mental,  or religious,  or
mythological, etc., talk has no ontological import.
13. The last part of this is certainly shared by Kim who thinks that there is no such thing as non-
reductive physicalism – the only genuine physicalism, for him, is reductive physicalism.
14. Besides, Davidson thinks the cost is unnecessary since he thinks he already has a response to
Kim’s objection, as we have just seen.
15. Tellingly,  the title  of  another  seminal  early  paper  of  his  in  the philosophy of  mind was
“Psychology as Philosophy,” rather than (presumably) “Psychology as Science.”
16. This terminology is of course intended to evoke Sellars's distinction between the “scientific”
and the “manifest” images of human beings, (Sellars, 1963: 1-40).
17. In fact,  Kant tightly connects freedom, reason and morality.  However freedom is not just
required for  moral  action it  is  required for  rational  action generally  (whether  instrumental,
prudential or moral). That is, moral action is a species of the genus: rational action, and this
genus requires freedom from causal determination in the following way: if we are to think of
ourselves as fully rational  we cannot think of  our actions as necessitated by our desires,  past
experiences, family influences, background, etc.. Instead we must freely choose which of those
inclinations and desires are to govern our thoughts or actions, based on our conception of what
we ought rationally to think or do. What distinguishes moral action as a special case of rational
action is that in addition to requiring freedom from causal determination (i.e. acting out of a
conception of what is the rational thing to do and imposing that on ourselves), it requires that
our conception of the rational thing to do (that we freely impose on ourselves) has universal
rational validity, that it is not just what is rational given some specific end or some particular
conception of happiness, but what is rational überhaupt,  irrespective of the particular ends or
conceptions of the good life held by specific individuals or groups.
18. We can say, of course, that if the rock is dropped it should fall at 9.8 m/s2, but the “should”
here is not the “should” of normative-rationality. It expresses what we expect as a matter of fact
to occur given our knowledge of physics; it is not a relation that should obtain independently of
the physical facts. The point is that belief attribution on the basis of neural state activity has both
“should” dimensions: not only should a believer, for example, hold the belief that p if he holds
the belief that p and q (in the sense that we expect the believer to, given our expectations and
experiences of what believers as a matter of fact happen to believe in such a situation), but the
believer should hold this belief in the sense that it is rationally required whether or not facts to
do with belief-holding behavior bear this out.
19. The contemporary spin Davidson puts on all this is that the mental/physical distinction is not
to  be  exactly  aligned  with  the  distinction  between  reason  and  cause but  rather  with  the
distinction between the rational and the causal or law-like (which is why I have taken pains to
add  this  somewhat  awkward  hyphenation  throughout).  This  is  because  Davidson  wants  his
distinction to cover the contrast between natural-scientific and rational modes of explanation,
and the notion of cause is no longer co-extensive with scientific laws, as nowadays scientific laws
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need not be thought of as strictly deterministic but can be probabilistic, e.g.,  quantum theory
suggests a radical absence of causal determinism at the sub-atomic level.
ABSTRACTS
This paper argues that Davidson’s position in the philosophy of mind undergoes a change from
his  early  writings  to  his  later  ones.  Whereas  the early Davidson emphasizes  how anomalous
monism expresses a token-identity form of physicalism, his later writings instead suggest that
anomalous monism articulates an “a-ontological” position. I aim to show both how the later a-
ontological  position  results  from  Davidson’s  particular  form  of  naturalism,  which  in  his
philosophy of mind gets expressed in the way he configures the mental/physical distinction as a
conceptual as opposed to an ontological distinction, as well as how it provides him with new
avenues  of  response  to  two  influential  criticisms  anomalous  monism  has  faced.  I  finish  by
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